

The strategy to establish the independent Palestinian state and achieve the rights of our people

Introduction

As the new US President Barack Obama assumed his post as the President of the United States, a new climate started to emerge at the level of international relations. The new United States Administration aims to improve the image and status of America, especially after the policies and wars that were led by the administrations of the neoconservatives, mainly the former US President George Bush. The efforts of the United States also aim to reduce the dangers and risks of the world monetary and economic crisis and alleviate its impact on the United States, and on the core of the Imperialist capitalist system and its network of interests in the center and periphery. Beside that to contain the transformation in the nature of the world order in a manner that can guarantee the US sole leadership amidst contradictions with other poles in the world.

The issues of Iraq and Afghanistan emerge as central questions in the approaches of the US foreign policy; however, the scope of this policy expands to include other international issues, in relation to Russia, China, the European Union, Latin America, the Middle East, and Iran, in addition to other issues related to armament and nuclear proliferation. The core of administering and dealing with these issues lies, the goal of re-arranging the regional interests and relations, that are full of contradictions, in a manner that serves the interests of the United States basically so that it could continue its sole leadership and monopoly of the world.

The importance of the Palestinian cause as a central issue that relates to all of the issues in the region has pushed Obama's Administration to declare its commitment to exert efforts towards the two-state solution and to assign the US Special Envoy George Mitchell to activate the political process. However, the interrelation of this issue with the other issues and regional balances in the region classifies it as a set of interrelated strategic issues. Thus, any progress in solving the Palestinian cause will remain subject to effects by these interrelations and overlaps, unless Palestinian national unity is achieved as soon as possible and regional alliances are built in a manner that provide real and serious support to the rights of our people and until Palestinians cling to a clear political address that calls for implementing international legitimacy.

The new American strategy

It is clear that the Administration of President Obama is adopting a new strategy in the Middle East which is based on two main basis: 1) To maintain the interests of the United States and its hegemony role in the region; 2) A comprehensive regional solution that can tackle a group of threats and balances in regional

interests. (As maintaining and protecting: the security and status of Israel, stopping the growing regional status of Iran and its nuclear scheme, re-strengthening the American-Turkish strategic alliance, reformulation of the Arab official regime status in the new map of balances).

The secret and magic word in the seriousness of the US efforts towards the peace process is the American readiness to implement international legitimacy resolutions through ending the occupation and achieving the rights of the Palestinian people and embark on practical steps to halt the daily settlement activities and Israeli expansion on the ground and reject the new settlement facts on the ground and the apartheid wall which are all illegitimate, and stop the current ethnic cleansing policy in the city of Jerusalem. Therefore, the Palestinian position that insists on rejecting “negotiations under settlements” and the war of home demolitions in Jerusalem is considered a decisive matter and test of the Palestinian leadership seriousness, and it is also a basis to achieve a firm Arab-international position that can force Israel to stop settlements and home demolition in the city of Jerusalem. This is the necessary prelude that could lead to the success of any political process; this is the way to revive the spirit of the peace process towards a new international peace conference based on implementing the international legitimacy resolutions and achieving peace. The way to achieve this is to take a firm Palestinian political position and raise a comprehensive crisis with the government of extreme right wing in Israel and not to wait for US diplomacy or others to do that.

This approach is necessary to confront the Israeli accelerating moves (that have started since the international community recognized the right of the Palestinian people to establish their independent state) to take away large parts of the land from the aspired state and to expand the settlement blocs and work on having the final say on the content of the state and reduce its sovereignty to the maximum extent possible, and make use of the various international schemes that ignored the issue of settlements in order to achieve its goals. Within this context come the Israeli efforts to isolate the Gaza Strip as an essential part of the Palestinian state and exclude Jerusalem. They want to keep the door open for any future partial solution, or establish an expanded self-rule in the form of an entity that could be linked with Jordan.

The Israeli project aims to reduce the Palestinian state borders and restrict it in the context of a new interim solution similar to the state with temporary borders and this scheme threatens with the elimination of the Palestinian sovereign state and its borders; the Israeli scheme even threatens the direct regional scope of the neighboring countries, especially Egypt and Jordan which will be facing a set of complications, crises and needs that will keep these two countries, in particular, captives to the Israeli conditions, demands and pressure, and part of regional security arrangements that Israel seeks to enforce, similar to the American-Israeli Understanding Memo, and in order to impose a final-status formula for the Palestinian cause at the expense of the Palestinian people, and at the expense of Jordan and Egypt, and also at the expense of the other Arab countries, including Lebanon, with regards to the refugees issue and other issues. Israel wants also to make use of the international community to serve the solution and provide guarantees for the implementation of the regional security and strategic

arrangements in a manner that consolidates its international alliance with the NATO and preserve the regional status of Israel in face of the new security challenges and dangers.

The just solution of the Palestinian cause is the sole alternative

At the time when the Palestinian cause – within the new international and regional context – gains relative advantage to improve its chances towards a just solution, there are indicators that the cause is about to lose its momentum because of three factors: 1) the destructive split that is harming the Palestinian national movement and the Palestinian political system. The split has expanded vertically at all geographical, political and organizational levels, in addition to its ramifications on the intellectual and ideological levels. 2) The independent Palestinian political decision has become less important in the circles of international and regional polarizations and interventions. 3) Escalation of the systemic Israeli attack aiming to make the Palestinian cause lose its historical and political achievements, through intensive and expansionist measures on the ground. Added to that the enforcement of a settlements map that will produce a solution before any agreement, and refraining from reaching any solution to remove the settlements in any future agreement, which means aborting the physical capabilities needed to establish a sovereign Palestinian state.

The above-mentioned factors represent a real threat to a just solution to the Palestinian cause, and defeating these factors can create a real chance towards investing the relative advantage of the cause in order to reach a real just solution to the Palestinian cause.

The regional peace formula based on the Arab Peace Initiative and the international legitimacy resolutions require a severe political engagement. Israel exerts all possible efforts to subject the Arab Peace Initiative to negotiations and dialogue with the Arab parties, and uses time and the available maneuvering space to circumvent the commitments of halting settlements and aggression; Israel is also proceeding in marginalizing the Palestinian partner politically. Instead, Israel is posing a different vision on peace based on reducing the future Palestinian state and achieving a regional economic-security formula with the Arab countries (especially the neighboring countries) prior to comprehensive withdrawal and banning the return to the borders of June 4, 1967, and the cancellation of the right of return of refugees in accordance with Resolution 194.

Concerning the Palestinian side, the regional peace formula based on the Arab Peace Initiative, if handled appropriately, could make a break through for the PLO away from the failing bilateral negotiations. This will also allow re-highlighting the Palestinian cause as a national liberation cause that will help making use of the Arab position, including the Syrian position, to improve the conditions towards a solution, based on international legitimacy resolutions. The independent Palestinian state as a sovereign state should be established on all territories

within the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital and to find a just solution to the Palestinian refugees' problem based on Resolution 194.

Resistance and negotiations: the need to conduct a comprehensive review

The requirements for serious handling and confronting all challenges and exiting opportunities necessitate conducting a comprehensive review of all the negotiations approach and how the negotiations were managed; there is also a need to review the approach of Hamas political and military management; these two trends caused more splits and pushed us away from the goals of the Palestinian struggle.

The management of the political and negotiations process contributed in further weakening the Palestinian negotiations position and reduced the ceiling of negotiations from ending the occupation and implementing the UN resolutions to fragmentation of the negotiations process and mixing between security and partial issues with direct strategic issues while Israel continued with its policies to change the facts on the ground on a daily basis through expanding settlements, building the apartheid wall, and Judaizing Jerusalem. Through adopting a policy of evading the requirements needed to end the occupation and securing security arrangements with Israel under occupation.

Review of the political process and Palestinian negotiations performance is needed today more than ever; it is a demand that has been called for by the PLO forces for so many years; despite this, there is insistence to neglect the matter and build illusions based on the roadmap and Annapolis, just like the same false promises by former US President George Bush and his administration.

There is a need to make deep changes in the negotiations and the political process, including a decision to stop adopting the roadmap as a basis for the political moves; we need to move towards the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 with Israeli withdrawal from the lands occupied in 1967, including Jerusalem, in accordance with several UN resolutions and The Hague Tribunal.

We need also to say here that the manner that Hamas managed the conflict has led to more splits and setbacks against the Palestinian people and their national cause; using “resistance” as a cover up cannot justify the mistakes.

Since its launching, Hamas Movement remained in conflict and competition with the PLO-before the beginning of the negotiating process, trying to take its role since the first intifada. Before that time, the PLO was leading the resistance .The Muslim Brotherhood did not have any contributions in the Palestinian struggle in the period between 1967 and 1987.

Regardless of the justifications that led to the coup of Hamas against the national unity government in 2007, Hamas Movement continued with its effort to

consolidate the separation of Gaza Strip from the West Bank. Hamas placed its control over Gaza Strip as a priority more important than the national dialogue and even more important than the need to end the siege imposed on Gaza Strip; Hamas is still leading this approach.

Hamas has shown in its conduct towards resistance or alliances or even towards the authority itself in a manner that maintains and preserves its interests, which are viewed by Hamas as more important than the public national interest. In this, Hamas is no different from the parasite bureaucratic sector in the PA.

Hamas granted itself the green light to change its position regarding resistance and its forms in accordance with its own interests and not based on principles of the causes it poses. This happened on the issue of martyrdom operations: Hamas decided to stop them but in the past it used to say that martyrdom operations will not stop. The same thing applied to the issue of the truce; Hamas became the guardian of the truce while in the past it used to criticize any party that tried to preserve the truce. Later, it returned to the truce under harsher conditions and in a situation worse than the conditions that emerged at the end of the first truce. By this Hamas reduced the goal of the resistance into the truce and opening of the crossings.

The Resistance has been used as a means to improve positions inside the national movement more than a means to end the occupation or achieve national independence. Later, we saw the calls for political negotiations as announced by Head of Hamas Politburo Khaled Mash'al to the foreign press when he expressed readiness to accept mostly the same political solution that the PLO is working on. Moreover, some Hamas representatives moved further to accept the formula of the state with temporary borders through communications with certain European countries. This shows that there is readiness to adjust despite all the "constant" slogans and principles.

The Palestinian People's Party has called from the beginning for making use of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza Strip in order to develop an internal reality in Gaza Strip vis-à-vis the national unity, steadfastness, growth and creation of a model that can support the efforts to end the occupation in the West Bank. This never happened as the internal conflict escalated and the split between Gaza Strip and the West Bank was deepened. Because of the wrong administration of disunited resistance, Gaza Strip is now under unprecedented security and logistic restrictions as realized in the American-Israeli Security Understanding Memo, and the monitoring of the borders. The Indirect Negotiations between Hamas and Israel is now limited to a clear security agreement formula on the size and kinds of items to be allowed into Gaza Strip and the extent of Gaza crossings opening to be allowed by Israel in return for Hamas guarantees not to fire rockets from Gaza Strip.

This regretful level of the "resistance" ceiling made by Hamas in Gaza is a natural outcome of the state of disunity and split and is a natural result of a scenario where resistance is used to improve representation and positions on the Palestinian, regional or international political map. However, this is not the destiny or fate of a resistance that enjoys a unified goal and reference and means

as stipulated in the National Reconciliation Document. This is not the fate of a Palestinian state of affairs united in action and goals to achieve the legitimate rights of our people. Within this context, it is necessary to re-define the role of Gaza Strip in the Palestinian national struggle: Is it a mere rocket launching pad? Or a ruling model that can support the end of occupation? It is high time to end the current state of duplicity between creating military clash and conflict in Gaza while the main conflict arena is the West Bank. Such duplicity is diverting the compass of the struggle which is supposed to be in the West Bank where there are settlements, annexation and Judaization processes.

The strategy of the PLO to establish the independent state and achieve the rights of the Palestinian people

From split to unity

The current reality of split and fragmentation of the Palestinian lands imposed by Israel and the Palestinian internal split calls for conducting an urgent process of comprehensive Palestinian review.

Since the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza Strip, Israel has imposed a clear divergence in political and legal realities between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Despite its failure to extract an international recognition on the legal reality of Gaza Strip away from the West Bank, Israel deals with Gaza Strip as an entity different from the West Bank and continued along with efforts to force the international community to deal with Gaza Strip in a similar manner. Then the Palestinian internal split came to extend a strong blow to the Palestinian conditions and helped Israel to create this separation between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, thus threatening the midpoint of the unity of Palestinian lands and the establishment of the Palestinian state. This allows the fragmentation of the lands into three clear parts: Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, which is being very isolated from the West Bank in accordance with the Israeli decision to annex the city in 1967, and the West Bank where settlements and expropriation of lands, with the apartheid wall that is limiting its area.

The ongoing fragmentation of the Palestinian lands represented an intensive Israeli strategy to besiege the Palestinian people and prevent them from establishing their independent state, and to control the future of the Palestinian right in terms of the areas of land ,borders ,water resources ,geographic unity and sovereignty of the state. Israel decided to tackle these core issues after concluding the Zionist scheme, of expanding the borders of the Israeli state through, taking away more parts of the West Bank lands, mainly the city of Jerusalem and its surrounding areas ,through expanding the settlement blocs and connecting them with the Israeli cities and after Israel can demarcate the final borders of the state of Israel.

Instead of facing all measures that aim to fragment the Palestinian lands with more unity and support by the PA and its legislative, executive and judicial branches in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and through consolidating the PLO status as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the PA

itself was fragmented between the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the PLO still has to be reactivated. This provided the occupation for the first time since 1967 a political organizational platform that has an interest in the split among the social circles that benefit from this state and from the discrepancies in the political future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The two-state solution: a national necessity

The current state of fragmentation and disunity makes the commitment to the independent Palestinian state solution as realization of the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people an ever-growing necessity. The international political moves on the basis of the two-state solution also gains strategic importance in face of the Israeli strategy that aims to eliminate this solution and achieve political and legal division of the Palestinian lands and people; it is the same strategy that moved the Zionist movement historically in dealing with the Palestinian people and their national cause.

However, the two-state solution as a slogan does not mean shunning away from clear definition of the Palestinian state and clinging to its borders and capital as a sovereign state on all territories occupied in 1967; the dangers facing the two-state solution does not mean accepting any state as part of the Israeli efforts to reduce its borders and control its resources and sovereignty or the attempts to transform the state into Gaza Strip only.

The Palestinian national interest calls for efforts and struggle to get rid of the illusion that there is a possibility to make Gaza Strip the core of the Palestinian state, especially that we wasted the historical chance to transform Gaza into a model that can support the struggle to end the occupation in the West Bank also. Israel has succeeded in isolating Gaza Strip and succeeded in justifying the siege imposed on it and besieged it with international security understanding memos, thus making it an entity separate from the Palestinian political system.

The Palestinian national interest also requires conducting a brave review that allows the PLO to regain its role and status as a body that can realize the right of the Palestinian people in self determination. The review will also allow the PLO to assume its initiating role, including the definition of the status of the PA and its status in relation to the PLO.

To stress on the temporary and interim nature of the PNA

The fact that the PNA can continue in the West Bank as a permanent authority under occupation and assuming the duties of an independent authority along with exaggerating its security duties can mean that this PNA will be isolated and will fail in transforming the PNA into a state as was stipulated at the end of the interim phase in 1999. This will represent, in case it continues, a historical failure on the part of the PLO which is the political reference for the PNA.

The PNA has exhausted the justifications of its presence as an interim authority. In light of the occupation controlling its political fate and the occupied territories The PNA has reached a state of split and objective divergence between its

conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip which is creating clear differences between its priorities, including its security priorities, and this could be seen in the West Bank which is classified into Zones A, B, and C, in addition to the limited relations between the PNA and Jerusalem.

The PNA has absorbed itself and became a subordinate authority. The PNA status as a “permanent” authority is an obstacle facing the need and urgency to end the occupation and to hold the international community responsible for this. It has become more dependant on privileges since the considerations of status and funds surpassed the consideration of space which has been largely reduced and fragmented since signing the Oslo Accords.

The philosophy used to re-arrange the affairs of the PNA since the roadmap and the role of the Quartet Committee Envoy Tony Blair are based on principles of reinforcing the security authority institutions, basically, and the economic institutions and the reform programs as part of a process to prepare for the establishment of the state. Such a philosophy can be easily criticized because one cannot understand the process of reinforcing the security apparatus role within the framework of security coordination and cooperation with Israel under the occupation. One cannot really comprehend the philosophy of depending on investment and economy with total dependence on the Israeli easing measures and the Israeli control of the economy and crossings. In practical terms, the philosophy of reform, investment, security development and economic development under occupation is a distorted philosophy in relation to the interests of the Palestinian people. All the above mentioned aspects lose their real meaning under occupation and under the fact that national independence has not been accomplished yet.

Despite this, it is high time to conduct a decisive test to this philosophy through defining a limited measurable time ceiling to conclude the negotiations and implement international legitimacy resolutions through the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and establishment of the Palestinian state on condition that all forms of settlements activities and expansion schemes are halted and until the removal of checkpoints and halt of the wall construction and halt of the frequent incursions. All this could be linked with the decision of the Arab Summit which said that the Arab Peace Initiative will not remain on the table forever.

Within this context, it is only legitimate to demand from the international community to deal with the formula of a national reconciliation government that can allow the return of national unity on the basis of a commitment by the government to consolidate the truce in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in return for halt of incursions and end of the siege, and on the basis of commitment to a serious political negotiations process by the PLO, in accordance with the National Reconciliation Document with the aim of implementing the international legitimacy resolutions and on condition that all this needs to take place within a set time table away from repeating the negative aspects of the past.

Within this context, setting up the time table and ceiling becomes the basis under all conditions in order to prepare the Palestinian internal affairs and declare the

transformation of the PA into a state and declare its borders on all territories occupied in 1967 with Jerusalem as its capital.

From the PA to the state: declaring the borders of the state

The establishment of the Palestinian state on all territories occupied in 1967 with East Jerusalem as its capital within a set time table, either as an outcome of a serious political process or as the result of a unilateral declaration by the PLO, can allow a real test of the readiness of the international community to establish an independent Palestinian state and recognize its borders as ratified by the UN resolutions, or placing the international community in front of a new reality which is to end all the past commitments of the PA towards Israel until ending the occupation on the lands of the Palestinian state and until achieving mutual recognition between the two states and until the nature of relations between the two states is defined and until a just solution is found for the Palestinian refugees cause based on Resolution 194.

The historical task of the PLO has been to achieve the rights and independence of the Palestinian people and only through this process, the PLO can regain its role and reactivate the issue of national independence and take the initiative once again.

Preparing for such a political step gives the current political momentum to resume the political process a different dimension. It also facilitates investing the new international climate and tests the seriousness of Obama's Administration in a concrete manner. It also assists the efforts to end the split in a manner that goes beyond the narrow partisan considerations. There is no doubt that this step is the serious political prelude to the reactivation of the PLO and towards developing its role and status, and to re-direct the policies of the PA and the tasks of its government in line with this option and prepare for the decisive battle towards independence.

The start of preparatory steps towards this option and work to disclose it in a direct manner as the outcome of a clear national decision to be taken by the PLO and its Central Council is the basis to reformulate the internal and external alliances and to re-arrange the priorities and work of the PA on its internal programs and external relations in a manner that can support the steadfastness of the people and support popular resistance and cause change in nature of relations towards the issues of lands, water and settlements and follow up the decisions of The Hague Tribunal and also on the nature of security coordination and other issues, and support the popular and grassroots structures and prepare for political and intellectual mobilization towards the decisive battle of extracting the establishment of the Palestinian state. All these steps can re-arrange the priorities in the right manner which can enable the Palestinian people and their forces to confront the Israeli strategy that aims to minimize the process of establishing the state. Such steps can also provide new capacities towards regaining Palestinian national unity based on national, democratic and popular principles. This requires that the PLO and the PA take the necessary steps to achieve community and national relations along with Arab and international relations.

1- Lessons of the war on Gaza

The urgency of such a step and serious preparations to confront the challenge gains more importance with the lessons from the war on Gaza and from the nature of the new Israeli government which (more extremist and right wing) and the ramifications of its policies, in addition to the series of measures that were started by the former Israeli government headed by Olmert.

The war of aggression on Gaza and the methods of the Israeli army came as a culmination of the military security philosophy that was adopted officially by the military, political and judicial institution in Israel. The second war on Lebanon was the first testing ground for the Israeli military philosophy which is based on reinforcing the deterrence force of the army through deliberate and criminal harm to the civilians who were made direct targets of the military operations and a part of the means of pressure to gain the war and reduce the size of losses in the Israeli army.

The Israeli security political institution concealed its philosophy through a series of internal legal and judicial consultations and decisions and took clear decisions to protect its officers and soldiers using all means in front of any judicial cases and deliberately destroyed all relevant documents and information. Israel consolidated this approach which it named “the Dahieh Ideology” through using it also in Gaza Strip which led to the martyrdom of more than 15,00 martyrs, most of whom were children and unarmed civilians, in addition to the injury of 5,000 citizens along with large scale destruction of homes and residential areas (more than 15,000 homes were destroyed).

For this reason, it was fully legitimate to intensify the efforts towards the coordination of an international campaign to track down Israel and its generals and political leaders who committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. There was a need also to follow up the efforts in order to prevent any retreat or violation of international treaties on treating civilians during times of war.

Apart from the criminal nature of targeting and striking civilians, the occupation government embarked on a systemic destruction of the infrastructure, including the strikes against the economic and industrial installations; Israel also tightened the siege on Gaza Strip and prevented the entry of material necessary for the reconstruction of homes or repairing the damaged homes and started a process of political bargaining in order to allow entry of some items; this led to the serious deterioration of the living conditions in Gaza Strip. Several international organizations, including the UNRWA, issued warnings regarding the serious hardship facing the people in Gaza Strip and the rise in poverty rates and the absence of basic life needs and requirements.

Through the status quo and control of the crossings and the siege, Israel enforced a new formula towards Gaza Strip; the core of this formula is the Israeli control of crossings and the siege, thus severing Gaza Strip from the West Bank, in addition to controlling the quality and quantities of material allowed into Gaza Strip without recognizing its status as an occupied territory.

Israel worked on expanding the political and security context in dealing with Gaza Strip as a different "entity" through the American-Israeli security agreement and the so-called agreement to fight arms smuggling into Gaza Strip and enforcing roles and tasks on the countries of the region, and using this as an excuse to start operations and strike the lands of the suspect countries, such as Syrian and Sudan.

The war on Gaza Strip illustrated the extent to which the occupation government can go in destroying Gaza Strip and the extent of state terrorism that Israel can exercise against unarmed civilians. The war on Gaza showed that Israel could use its military capabilities in an unbalanced manner against the Palestinian people and its institutions amid a process of internal mobilization and incitement from the various Zionist parties. This situation has continued even after the war, especially in the tight siege on Gaza Strip and the enforcement of a new relation with Gaza Strip based on "security for food". Israel has continued its military incursions inside Gaza Strip and insisted on keeping its own mechanism of unilateral decision taking as an extension to the unilateral ceasefire decision without resulting in a clear resolution from the Security Council or even a clear truce or ceasefire agreement.

The risks of this Israeli policy still exist with the possibility of launching another aggression on Gaza Strip through the new Israeli government; there is the risk of continuous military incursions and provocations and siege, especially after linking all of these measures with the case of the soldier Shalit and the Israeli position that rejects reaching a clear truce agreement.

As part of objective assessment of the philosophy that governed the role of Gaza Strip and the forms of resistance in it, it is our duty now that the war has calmed down to speak honestly and say that the past philosophy built on viewing Gaza as an independent party for resistance is proven wrong, and it was also a mistake to fall into the Israeli trap as Hamas and other Palestinian forces were dragged by Israel to reject the truce. We need to say in this context that the past scenario in Gaza Strip was not inevitable and that we could have avoided it through ending the internal split and renewal of the truce and not declare that the truce cannot be renewed. We need to say also that there is a need to fight the emerging phenomenon of "tunnels economy" which destroys the national economy in Gaza Strip and which led to the rising of a beneficiary socio-political sector that has an interest in keeping the tunnels as an image reflecting a socio-economic state that harms Gaza Strip economically, politically and socially.

2- Defining the urgent tasks to confront the current conditions

First, there is a need to continue working and exerting pressure to end the internal split and regain national unity through the democratic process of legislative and presidential elections within a date not exceeding January 25, 2010 and the need to respect the results of elections in line with efforts to resume comprehensive national dialogue to settle the outstanding issues.

The Palestinian People's Party has exerted tremendous efforts for the sake of national dialogue whose results have been limited as there was a clear desire to

stall and evade taking decisions. We need to be aware not to contribute in justifying the stalling or in justifying the emergence of an "institution that runs the affairs of the process" of dialogue through endless rounds of dialogue without reaching results that could lead to the immediate end of the split. Therefore, we reject any stalling and we believe that the way out of this is through democratic elections on the same date as a constitutional commitment and democratic right of the Palestinian people.

Second, we need to maintain and preserve the PLO and reinforce its role through activating it and reinforcing alliances among its forces based on correct and sound principles and mechanisms that can guarantee real partnership on the basis of an agreement on the political plan and the action plan of the PA with a clear plan to activate the PLO role and leadership institutions.

Third, there is a need to expand, organize and unify popular resistance in face of the occupation and settlements through the committees that resist the wall and through boycotting the goods and other means and through serious work to keep the momentum of such acts and measures despite the existing challenges. The path of our party to reinforce the popular resistance has proved its efficiency in the past and the popular Intifada in 1987 was a clear illustration of this. This path proves its soundness today in light of the need to review objectively the current experience of Palestinian resistance.

Fourth, we need to deepen the national and democratic alliances with the political and community forces and build the necessary frameworks. We need to exert efforts to build a progressive socio-political bloc from the leftist and social forces and independent figures who have progressive tendencies in order to cause core progressive changes on the political map and policies and priorities in the national, social and democratic fields and end the split and regain the unity of the homeland.

Fifth, we need to deepen political and social alliances with the leftist, communist and democratic forces and parties and with solidarity movements whose roles come as priority in our tasks in order to maintain solidarity with our struggle to achieve liberation; we need to intensify efforts and organize campaigns of solidarity and international support to popular struggle and work on taking the Israeli war criminals to international justice tribunals.

Sixth, there is a need to formulate a clear strategic role for Gaza Strip and its status in protecting the national project and in reinforcing the steadfastness of its people. This requires clear process of review and assessment based on the fact that Gaza Strip must not remain solely as a military front that confronts the occupation because this transformed Gaza Strip into a target for continuous Israeli strikes and the isolation of Gaza Strip. Moreover, the past scenario in Gaza Strip led to efforts seeking separate solutions for Gaza Strip, such as opening the crossings or ending the siege or the truce that has become a priority instead of trying to expand resistance. Since the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza Strip, our party has called for a strategy based on to reinforce steadfastness of the people and improve the economic conditions in Gaza Strip and reinforce the exercise of democracy so that it can become an added value in the process of national

independence. This can take away the excuses used to justify the Israeli strikes; this can also nullify the justification of obstructing the end of occupation on all Palestinian territories because this strategy is the best pattern to end the siege on Gaza and to reject isolating it and it will assist in reinforcing its status in protecting the national project.

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Notice: This political position by the Palestinian People's Party has been declared four months before the document of Mr. Salam Fiad the prime minister of the Palestinian care taking government, about establishing a Palestinian State in two years, and entails an answer on his plan.